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NOTE
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND AN
INSOLVENT SELLER'S POSSESSION OF
GOODS SOLD
The adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code' in its present form
may substantially affect the rights of various parties who may have inter-
ests in goods that are in the possession of a seller who becomes insolvent.
In particular, when the goods involved had been previously sold to a buyer,
with the seller nevertheless retaining possession, the buyer's efforts to ob-
tain possession of the goods he had bought may be resisted by creditors who
want to get satisfaction for their debts from all of the seller's assets, includ-
ing these goods. This Note will examine how existing law compromises the
conflicting interests of the buyer and the creditors and the effect that the
Code will have on the problem.
THE CONFLICTING INTERESTS
Creditors
Both the buyer and the creditors can present strong arguments to
support awarding a judgment in their interest. One of the best known
rationales behind recovery by the creditors is the doctrine of "ostensible
ownership." It was thought that the buyer and the seller, by agreeing to
allow the seller to continue in possession of the goods, had created the ap-
pearance that the seller owned the goods-a circumstance likely to prejudice
any creditor who might rely upon this apparent ownership. "Possession
with the appearance of ownership renders the property liable for the debts
of the possessor to those who gave him credit on the faith of it." 2
This supposition that creditors rely upon possession of specific goods
is of doubtful validity today. While reliance on specific assets may be
significant in neighborhood or non-commercial dealings, in the large bulk
of modem commercial transactions, such reliance is unusual either in
making the initial decision to extend credit or influencing an existing
creditor of his most advantageous course of conduct.
1. The Uniform Commercial Code was proposed by the American Law Institute
and has been adopted in Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A (Purdon 1954).
2. Ryall v. Rowles, 1 Ves. Sr. 348 (1749). For a discussion of the doctrine of
reputed or ostensible ownership, see 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND
PRE~mmNcEs § 341-343c (rev. ed. 1940).
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Extension of Credit.-In normal commercial transactions, the creditor
makes his decision on whether or not initially to extend credit primarily
in reliance upon the seller's business prospects and credit history8 He is
likely to place principal emphasis upon indications of the seller's anticipated
income, since that is the source out of which the debt will be satisfied in
the normal course of events.4 The prudent creditor cannot overlook the
possibility that the anticipated receipts may not materialize, however, and
so must also take note of the seller's ability to weather normal business
hazards as reflected by the seller's net asset position. In neither event is
it probable that he secures this information by inspecting what specific
goods are in seller's possession. Rather, this data is derived from financial
statements procured from credit agencies or directly from the seller and
from interchanges of ledger information among the seller's suppliers which
indicate the current position of the seller's trade liabilities and how he is
meeting them.5
Pre-existing Debt.-Reliance by creditors who had extended credit
before the purchase of the goods in question is also unlikely. Although the
seller's retention of the goods sold would reveal no change in the seller's
financial position, the decision to extend further credit or to press existing
claims more likely is made on the basis of other indications of financial
stability such as the filing of security interests on the seller's assets, the
institution of suit against the seller by other creditors," or revised credit
ratings.
7
Attaching Creditor.--The one person who undoubtedly has relied on
the seller's possession is the creditor who levies on the goods. If, subse-
quently, he should lose the goods to the buyer, the seller's assets may then be
insufficient to satisfy the creditor's claim. Some assets may have dis-
appeared while others may have been attached by other creditors. Although
liens obtained by other creditors on the seller's assets can be voided in
3. JACOBY & SAULNEIR, TERM LENDING TO BUSINESS 80-81 (1942); SCHULTZ &
REINHART, CREDIT AND COLLECTION MANAGEMENT 245-54 (2d ed. 1954).
4. JACOBY & SAULNIER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 81.
5. SCHULTZ & REINHART, op. cit. supra note 3, at 248-50. Commercial banks, for
example, are unwilling to extend term credit to a concern with a ratio of current
assets to current liabilities which is less favorable than 2/1. Credit is commonly re-
fused to firms engaged in accounts receivable financing since this indicates a lack of
working capital. On the other hand, concerns which have mortgaged their fixed
assets are often granted term loans provided there is an adequate cushion of equity
and an established earning power. JACOBY & SAULNIER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 82.
6. In some metropolitan areas a commercial market has been found for daily
litigation lists. The institution of suit against a customer may at least cause an in-
vestigation of his credit standing. SCHULTZ & REINHART, op. Cit. supra note 3, at
96-98. Exchanges in ledger information give a more precise indication of changes in
credit standing. Many credit agencies provide their subscribers with lists of delinquent
debtors.
7. Many sources indicate changes in credit standing. The Dun & Bradstreet
Reference Book is issued six times a year. Credit Exchange issues a Weekly Change
List containing the latest information on accounts on which there has been a change
in recommendation. Id. at 59, 88.
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bankruptcy,8 proceedings may be to no avail,9 legally impossible 10 or so
expensive as to be prohibitive.1
The "ostensible ownership" theory stresses the fact that a creditor may
act in reliance on the seller's possession of specific goods. An equally
important consideration arises quite apart from reliance. Conveyances for
little or no consideration to a cooperative "buyer" have been used fre-
quently in an effort to place the "seller's" assets beyond the reach of cred-
itors. Retention under these circumstances does not in itself harm the
creditors, but it makes the "conveyance" so advantageous that it has long
been considered a badge of fraud.'2
Buyers
Balanced in opposition to the interests of the creditors of the insolvent
seller is the desire of the buyer to obtain possession of the goods he con-
tracted to purchase. There are many situations in which it is commercially
reasonable, or even necessary, that the seller continue to hold the goods
after the sale. For example, the buyer may not have storage space avail-
able to accept delivery, the seller may be unable to make immediate ship-
ment, or the buyer may intend to resell so that shipment to him would be
economically wasteful. In other cases it may have been necessary for
the buyer to make an advance payment to enable the seller to obtain the
basic goods which the seller is holding to process or complete. Thus legiti-
mate business purposes, and not only an intent to defraud creditors, may
underlie the fact that seller had possession of buyer's goods at the time of
insolvency.
The situation in which the conflict of interest is most difficult to rec-
oncile arises when the buyer has made a partial or total advance payment
to the seller. When insolvency occurs, the prepayment may have been
used by the seller in an effort to alleviate his financial pressures. Obvi-
ously, in such a case, both the buyer who advanced the money and the
creditors who seek satisfaction from the goods cannot be made whole. If
the buyer prevails, he will pay in only the balance of the price due, leaving
the creditors with fewer assets out of which to settle their claims. If the
creditors prevail, the buyer is forced to recoup his losses along with the
8. Section 67a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that every lien obtained by
legal or equitable process within four months of the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy shall be null and void if the debtor was insolvent at the time the lien was
obtained. 66 STAT. 427, 11 U.S.C. § 107a(1) (1952).
9. If four months have passed between the attachment and the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy, the lien is not voidable. Ibid.
10. Involuntary proceedings in bankruptcy can be instituted only by three or more
creditors who have provable, liquidated claims. 66 STAT. 425, 11 U.S.C. § 95b (1952).
It must be shown that an act of bankruptcy has been committed as defined in section
32 of the Bankruptcy Act, 66 STAT. 421, 11 U.S.C. §21(a) (1952).
11. In recent years the costs of bankruptcy have absorbed about one quarter of all
the available bankruptcy assets. ScHuLTZ & REINHART, op. cit. supra note 3, at 430.
12. See Twynes Case, 3 Co. Rep. 806 (1601).
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general creditors, instead of coming out substantially unscathed from the
transaction.
Even if the buyer has not prepaid on the purchase contract, the rec-
onciliation of competing claims of the buyer and the creditors is not easy.
It would appear that in such a circumstance, the reasonable solution is to
allow the buyer to take possession upon payment of the price into the fund
available to creditors. The buyer is thus protected from the ramifications
that could result from failure to receive the goods as anticipated under his
contract with seller if the goods were not replaceable. Even if he can secure
the goods elsewhere, the buyer may be under contract to resell and it may
be too late to avoid being in default to his obligee. Certainly the creditors
seem to have no reason to complain, especially if the goods are manufac-
tured to the buyer's specifications and hence not marketable to others.
However, such a solution is premised upon the contract price equalling
the fair market value of the goods at the time of insolvency. If there has
been an appreciable rise in the value of the goods, creditors will be most
unwilling to allow buyer to take the goods upon paying in an amount less
than their actual worth.
PRIoR LAw 1
State courts and legislatures have evidenced disapproval of the seller's
retention of the goods sold when claims of creditors intervene.14 Unless
delivery is made within a reasonable time, some jurisdictions have allowed
the levying creditor 15 to void the transaction as a matter of law regardless
of the good faith of the parties.' 6 A larger number of states have adopted
the rule that a retention transaction is only presumptively fraudulent,1
7
13. The term "prior law" is used in this Note to identify the law applicable in
a jurisdiction before the Uniform Commercial Code is adopted. Depending on the
jurisdiction, this may mean common law, the Uniform Sales Act, when applicable,
or supplementary legislation.
14. Most states have passed statutes specifically aimed at the creditor's rights
in retained goods. Only New Mexico has failed to pass on this matter either by
statute or decision. All the other states have established obstacles to the buyer's
recovery as against the seller's creditors. 2 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 349-404 (rev.
ed. 1948).
15. Some cases have held that the doctrine is limited to levying creditors, e.g.,
Clough v. Glines & Stevens Co., 77 N.H. 408, 92 Adt. 803 (1914); McGann v.
Capital Saving Bank & Trust Co., 117 Vt. 179, 89 A2d 123 (1952); cf. Daniels
v. Nelson, 41 Vt. 161 (1868) (rulet does not apply against tax collectors) ; see also
Murphy v. W. T. Murphy & Co., 126 Iowa 57, 101 N.W. 486 (1904). Many
of the statutes, however, state that both prior and subsequent creditors may take
advantage of the rule. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 33-107 (Burns 1949) ; MINr. STAT.
ANN. § 513.12 (West 1947) ; OxuA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 6 (1937).
At least one court has taken the view that the doctrine is limited to subsequent
creditors. Smith v. Cooper Marble Co., 48 Ohio App. 65, 192 N.E. 282 (1933).
Others appear to limit it to pre-existing creditors. McCullough v. Wiley, 192 Pa.
176, 43 At. 999 (1899) ; see WASH. REv. CODE § 65.08.040 (1951).
16. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3440 (1949) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 6 (1937);
Southern California Collection Co. v. Napkie, 106 Cal. App. .d 565, 235 P.2d 434
(1951); Callahan v. Union Trust Co., 315 Pa. 274, 172 Atl. 684 (1934).
17. E.g., Wooley v. Crescent Automobile Co., 83 N.J.L. 244, 83 At. 876 (Sup.
Ct. 1912); Holley v. A. W. Haile Motor Co., 188 App. Div. 798, 177 N.Y. Supp.
429 (4th Dep't 1919) ; AaRz. CODE ANN. § 58-103 (1939) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. § 33-103
(1949).
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while a few states have supplemented one or the other of these rules with
the requirement that the bill of sale be recorded if the buyer is to prevail.' 8
In a presumption jurisdiction, the interests of a legitimate buyer are
not seriously jeopardized. Evidence that adequate consideration was
given 19 and that there was no intent to defraud the seller's creditors 20 will
overcome the presumption. Evidence of the buyer's good faith will gen-
erally suffice,21 but, in at least one jurisdiction, the seller's good faith must
be proved as well. 22 In addition, a reasonable explanation for the failure
to take immediate delivery may be required.2
The buyer in a fraud-in-law jurisdiction will lose his interest in the
goods unless the seller's retention is reasonable in point of time. What
constitutes a reasonable time depends to some extent on the buyer's dili-
gence in preparing to remove the goods 24 and his ability to take immediate
delivery of the type of goods in question.25 In general, however, a rea-
sonable time seems to be construed as the shortest time in which it is
physically possible for the buyer to accept delivery.2 6 If the goods are
bulky, the buyer may effect a constructive delivery by identifying the goods
as his own,a2 but his failure to do so may defeat his claim even though actual
immediate delivery may be commercially infeasible.28 In some states, actual
18. Per se rule applicable if bill of sale is not recorded: HAWAn REV. LAWS
c. 308: § 12758 (1945); IoW.A CODE ANN. § 556.3 (1951); MD. ANN. CoDE GEN.
LAws art. 21, §§49-59 (1951); WAsH. REv. CoDE §65.08.040 (1953). Presumption
rule applicable if bill of sale is not recorded: D.C. CoDE ANN. § 42-101 (1951);
N.D. REv. CODE § 12-0106 (1943) ; Splain v. B. F. Goodrich Rubber Co., 290 Fed.
275, 277-78 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In some cases, even if the bill of sale is recorded, the
buyer may have to rebut a presumption of fraud. Ky. REV. STAT. § 378.040 (1953);
VA. CoDE M 55-96 (1950).
19. Scruggs v. Blackshear Mfg. Co., 45 Ga. App. 855, 166 S.E. 249 (1932).
20. Burke v. Sharpe, 88 Ark. 433, 115 S.W. 145 (1908); Holley v. A. W.
Haile Motor Co., 188 App. Div. 798, 177 N.Y. Supp. 429 (4th Dep't 1919).
21. Tousley v. First Nat'l Bank, 155 Minn. 162, 193 N.W. 38 (1923); Houlley
v. A. W. Haile Motor Co., 188 App. Div. 798, 177 N.Y Supp. 429 (4th Dep't 1919)
(by implication).
22. Kruse v. Carey, 259 Mich. 157, 160, 242 N.W. 873, 874 (1932).
23. E.g., Ward v. Shirley, 131 Ala. 568, 23 So. 489 (1902); Freedman v.
Avery, 89 Conn. 439, 94 At. 969 (1915); see Volusia County Bank v. Bertola, 44
Fla. 734, 738, 33 So. 448, 450 (1902).
24. Compare White v. Pease, 15 Utah 170, 49 Pac. 416, 417 (1897), with
Seymour v. O'Keefe, 44 Conn. 128, 131 (1876).
25. Taylor v. Smith, 17 B. Mon. 536 (Ky. 1856); State ex rel. Baumunk v.
Goetz, 131 Mo. 675, 33 S.W. 161 (1895); see Meade v. Smith, 16 Conn. 346, 364
(1844) (dictum); Trimble v. Hunt, 169 Ill. App. 259, 262 (1912) (dictum); cf.
Freedman v. Avery, 89 Conn. 439, 94 Atl. 969 (1915); McCullough v. Willey, 200
Pa. 168, 49 AtI. 944 (1901).
26. State ex rel. Baumunk v. Goetz, 131 Mo. 675, 680, 33 S.W. 161, 162 (1895);
Bishop v. O'Connell, 56 Mo. 158 (1874).
27. Crymble v. Mulvaney, 21 Colo. 203, 40 Pac. 499 (1895); Dover Lumber
Co. v. Whitcomb, 54 Mont. 141, 168 Pac. 947 (1917); Western Mining Supply Co.
v. Quinn, 40 Mont. 156, 105 Pac. 732 (1909).
28. Seymour v. O'Keefe, 44 Conn. 128 (1876); Jacobson v. O'Keefe, 190 Ill.
App. 266 (1914). But see Carroll v. Haskins, 212 Mass. 593, 99 N.E. 477 (1912);
see also Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Plunkett, 89 Vt. 177, 94 AUt. 845 (1915).
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delivery is required despite an agreement that the seller is to act as the
buyer's agent29 or bailee. 0
The Uniform Sales Act did nothing to change the law of seller reten-
tion. Section 26 of the act provides:
"Where a person having sold goods continues in possession of the
goods . . . and such retention of possession is fraudulent in fact or
is deemed fraudulent under any rule of law, a creditor or creditors
of the seller may treat the sale as void."
However, the adoption of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act might
be construed as an implied repeal of the fraud-in-law doctrine. 3 1  Section
7 provides:
"Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual
intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay,
or defraud either present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both
present and future creditors."
While the act does provide for voiding conveyances under special circum-
stances without regard to intent,3 2 it has no provision regarding seller
retention. Despite the act's apparent comprehensiveness, the fraud-in-law
rule has been applied without mention of the effect of the adoption of the
statute.3s
In any case, none of the applicable rules regarding seller retention
satisfactorily balance the interests of buyers and creditors. Although the
application of the presumption that the transaction is fraudulent protects
the creditor against fraudulent conveyances, it gives little protection against
the seller's misrepresentations since only proof of the buyer's good faith is
generally required.34 Moreover, the buyer's good faith is of little satis-
29. Seavey v. Walker, 108 Ind. 78, 9 N.E. 347 (1886); Clark v. Porter, 180
Okla. 179, 68 P.2d 844 (1937). However, once buyer has taken possession, he may
redeliver it to seller. White v. O'Brien, 61 Conn. 34, 13 Atl. 750 (1891) ; Deere v.
Needles, 65 Iowa 101, 21 N.W. 203 (1884). There seems to be a-distinction drawn
between sales in bulk and single items. Compare Clark v. Porter, supra, ath
Keller v. Tracy, 183 Okla. 463, 82 P.2d 1046 (1938), and Kaplinsd v. Horwitz,
114 Conn. 523, 159 Atl. 351 (1932).
30. O'Connor v. O'Connor, Rice & Barnes, Inc., 44 Cal. App. 2d 1, 111 P2d
656 (1941). But cf. Kaplinski v. Horwitz, 114 Conn. 523, 159 Atl. 351 (1932);
Thompson v. Esty, 69 N.H. 55, 45 Atl. 566 (1896).
31. The Commissioners' prefatory note states that the uniform law was required
by the confusions and uncertainties of the existing law, one of which was . . .
the attempt to make the Statute of Elizabeth cover all conveyances which wrong
creditors, even though the actual intent to defraud does not exist." 9A UNIFORM
LAws ANN. 43 (1951).
32. Frau~dulent intent is not required to invalidate conveyances by a person who
is or will be thereby rendered insolvent (§ 4); conveyances made without fair
consideration which leave unreasonably small capital in the hands of the transferor
(Q 5) ; conveyances made without fair consideration by one who "intends or believes
that he will incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they mature." (§ 6).
33. See Shipler v. New Castle Paper Products Corp., 293 Pa. 412, 143 Atl. 182
(1928).
34. See text at note 22 and note 22 supra.
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faction to the levying creditor who may be unable to satisfy his claim if
he loses the goods to the buyer. The fraud-in-law rule protects the credi-
tors from the risk of loss, but its strict construction of reasonable time
fails to take into account the commercial needs of buyers in allowing the
seller to retain the goods. When advance payments are made, the buyer's
only resort is that of a general creditor of the seller, and his failure to
receive the goods may force him to breach his obligations to other parties.
SELLER RETENTION UNDER THE SALES ARTICLE
The Basic Provision
Although the Uniform Commercial Code continues, at least to some
extent, the approach of the Uniform Sales Act in following the local law,
it also evidences an awareness of the legitimate business purposes to be
served by seller retention. Section 2-402 (1) provides:
"A creditor of the seller may treat a sale or an identification of
goods to a contract for sale as void if as against him a retention of
possession by the seller is fraudulent under any rule of law of the state
where the goods are situated, except that retention of possession in
good faith and current course of trade by a merchant-seller for a com-
mercially reasonable time after a sale or identification is not fraud-
ulent."
The use of the phrasing "fraudulent under any rule of law" indicates that
the exception to the creditor's right to void the transaction is intended to
affect only the law of the fraud-in-law jurisdiction. This conclusion can be
supported by either of two theories. First, it may be argued that the words
"rule of law" do not include a presumption. While some rules of law
masquerade as "presumptions," 85 they are conclusive and irrebutable and
thus do not encompass the type of presumption found in a presumption
jurisdiction. If it is accepted that the presumption doctrine is not in-
corporated into this section of the Code, the exception clause would be
inoperative in the presumption jurisdiction because the exception modifies
only an existing rule of law which has been incorporated into the Code.
Under the second theory, even if the law of a presumption jurisdiction
is codified by the Code's acceptance of existing law, the exception clause
would not cause a different effect in transactions to which it is applicable.
No sale would be deemed "not fraudulent" tinder the exception if the
presumption doctrine would have reached an opposite result.3 6 The fact
35. See, e.g., 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2492 (3d ed. 1940).
36. Superficially it appears that a different result may be reached because the
exception clause requires good faith on the part of the seller while the presumption
rule turns on the good faith of the buyer. Even if this distinction exists, it is
virtually impossible to imagine transactions in which the buyer could be acting in
bad faith if the seller is deemed to have acted in good faith.
The theory that section 2-402 applies to a presumption jurisdiction but makes
no change is consistent with the recent statement by the draftsmen that ". . . the
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that the exception clause is not so broad as the presumption of prior
law is explained by the comment of the draftsmen that the section was
drafted with the limited purpose of serving the legitimate business
interests of buyers and sellers in the retention transaction without un-
necessarily affecting local law on questions of hindrance of creditors.87
Thus in a presumption jurisdiction, the buyer's burden of proof remains
unchanged, but in a fraud-in-law state, the buyer may defeat the creditor's
claim by showing that the goods were retained in good faith and current
course of trade by a merchant-seller for a commercially reasonable time.
Merchant-Seller.-One of the major limitations on the applicability of
the Code's exception is the requirement that retention must be by a mer-
chant-seller. A merchant is defined as "a person who deals in goods of the
kind or otherwise . . . holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction. . . . , 38
Since the definition is phrased in the alternative, a person may be a mer-
chant for one purpose but not for another. For purposes of determining
the applicability of the Statute of Frauds"9 or other sections involving
contractual formalities," any merchant acting in that capacity may be
deemed to be aware of normal business practices. However, if the issue
were a breach of warranty of merchantable quality, a seller would be a
merchant only as to those goods in which he normally deals since it is only
in this capacity that the seller would know the standards of quality which
would "pass without objection in the trade under the contract description." 41
The latest proposed comment on the definition of a merchant states
that for purposes of section 2-402, a person is a merchant only with respect
to those goods with which he normally deals.2 Since sales of other goods
would constitute only a small proportion of commercial transactions, the
need for revision of prior law as to these goods is not significant.
Current Course of Trade.-The import of the requirement that reten-
tion be in current course of trade is unclear since the term is never defined
in the Code. Comment 2 to section 2-402 describes the ambiguous phrase
with the equally ambiguous "general commercial understanding of what a
'current' transaction is." 4 The use of similar terms in other articles of
the Code would suggest that this may refer to the commercial need for
the type of retention involved. A holder of a negotiable document of title,
exception is merely a particular example of the rule that the presumption of fraud
is rebuttable by evidence of good faith." UNIFORm COimCIAL CODE, Supplement
No. 1, at 102 (Sub-Committee Report 1955).
37. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-402, comment 1 (hereinafter cited as UCC).
38. UCC § 2-104(1).
39. UCC § 2-201. Subsection (2) is applicable only to merchants.
40. Several provisions dealing with contract formation are applicable only to
merchants. E.g., UCC § 2-205 (firm offers); id. § 2-207(2) (additional terms on
acceptances).
41. UCC §2-314.
42. UCC, Supplement No. 1, at 97 (Sub-Committee Report 1955).
43. UCC § 2-402, comment 2.
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for example, acquires title to the document only if it was negotiated in the
"current course of business or financing." 44 The draftsmen explain that
the use of this term was intended to protect "that great run of commercial
transactions which are patently current and normal" even though this may
allow some persons to convey rights which they do not have.4 Similarly,
a buyer "in ordinary course" is defined so as to exclude pawnbrokers,4"
and, like negotiations in current course, 47 does not include transfers for
pre-existing debts.
48
This line of interpretation would indicate that retentions in connection
with transfers for past consideration are not in current course. Section
2-402(2), the only other section in which the term is used, gives consider-
able support to this conclusion. It provides:
"Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to impair the rights of credi-
tors of the seller where identification to the contract and delivery are
made not in current course of trade but in satisfaction of or as secu-
rity for a pre-existing claim for money, security or the like and are
made under circumstances which apart from this Article would con-
stitute the transaction a fraudulent transfer or voidable preference." 49
It should be noted that this has no direct application to the problem raised
by the seller's retention since it is operative only when both identification
and delivery have taken place. However, the appositive use of the term
would seem to exclude transfers made for past consideration from the class
of current course transactions. On the other hand, this would not ex-
clude enabling advance transactions from current course since the transfer
of goods to the advancing buyer is not made in satisfaction of or as security
for a pre-existing claim for money. 0
When new value is given, however, the determination of whether re-
tention is in current course of trade will be extremely difficult. A court is
hardly in the position to measure the commercial need of the retention in
question so that whether the retention is in fact a common occurrence in
commercial transactions will undoubtedly be a major consideration in the
court's judgment. In any case, the court may be reticent to make a broad
policy judgment on the basis of the current course requirement.
Commercially Reasonable Time.-The use of the word "commercially"
in the additional requirement of a commercially reasonable time seems to
44. UCC § 7-501(4).
45. Id. comment 1.
46. UCC § 1-201(9).
47. UCC § 7-501, comment 1.
48. UCC § 1-201(9).
49. UCC § 2-402(2) (Emphasis added.)
50. Support for the position that some advances are considered to be given
for new value may be found in analogy to § 9-108(2). Although the section deals
with after-acquired property, it does provide that under certain conditions an ad-
vance by the secured party may be deemed as new value.
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be aimed primarily at liberalizing the concept of a reasonable time under
prior law in a fraud-in-law jurisdiction.51 The extent to which this wifl
change the law is uncertain, but if it is interpreted with reference to the
commercial need for the retention transaction in question, a decision on
this basis might yield the same result in many cases as would the applica-
tion of the current course requirement.
Good Faith.-A literal reading of the language of the section will
establish that retention by the seller must have been in good faith. Good
faith is defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cerned" 52 and in the case of a merchant includes "observance of reasonable
commercial standards." - Yet neither of these definitions clarifies the
meaning of the requirement in the section 2-402 exception. It is possible
that the need for good faith was inserted only to prevent the sham transac-
tion. However, it may have some more restrictive function if it is inter-
preted to apply to the seller's subjective intent. It is also unclear whether
the good faith requirement was meant to apply in a situation where the
decision to retain was made in good faith on the part of both the buyer
and seller, but thereafter the seller abused his having possession of the
goods by misrepresenting them as his own to a creditor. An acceptable
solution would be to interpret the requirement of good faith as merely
precluding the buyer's recovery when he, as a reasonable buyer, could have
detected that the seller had fraudulent designs in retaining the goods.
A requirement that the buyer also must act in good faith is not so
apparent from the language of the Code, but the provision might be so
construed. However, the case would rarely arise in which the seller acted
in good faith while the buyer did not, and in any case, a bad faith buyer
would probably be unable to recover.5 '
As a partial solution to the problem of the seller's retention, the mer-
chant-seller exception of section 2-402 provides a better balance of the
interests of buyers and creditors than did prior law. The limitation of
retention to those in current course by a merchant-seller for a commercially
reasonable time serves the commercial needs of buyers, and, to a large
extent, protects the creditor from the results of his reliance on the seller's
possession. Although the terms of the exception tend to merge and are
quite vague, this may be necessary to serve the interests of buyers without
repealing the fraud-in-law rule entirely. In face of the enormous variety
of contingencies which may make retention commercially beneficial, a
clearly defined exception cannot be expected. In the presumption juris-
diction, the law remains unchanged so that in many cases, the attaching
creditor has no protection from the results of his reliance even though the
retention served no significant commercial purpose.
51. See discussion in text at notes 24-27 mpra.
52. UCC § 1-201 (19).
53. UCC §2-103(1) (b).
54. The court might find against the buyer by applying the maxim that unfair
or unjust conduct will preclude equitable relief. See Dent v. Ferguson, 132 U.S.
50 (1889) ; Fonner v. Martens, 186 Cal. 623, 200 Pac. 405 (1921) ; King v. Antrim
Lumber Co., 70 Okla. 52, 172 Pac. 958 (1917).
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Buyer's Remedies Under the Code
The impact of section 2-402 is to define the method of determining
whether the buyer or creditors have a superior claim to certain goods. It
retains existing law which makes seller retention of the goods fraudulent;
the exception clause simply provides that retention under its stated condi-
tions is not fraudulent. Since the language makes no specific provision
for remedy, the operative effect of the section must be examined to deter-
mine whether or not it is applicable apart from the sections of the Code
which expressly create the buyer's proprietary remedies. If the buyer has
no claim to possession, he is relegated to the position of other unsecured
creditors whose monetary claims are settled without regard to any one
specific asset. Therefore, unless the buyer can successfully assert his right
to possession of the goods under some other Code provision, it would
appear that the creditors need not resort to their right to treat the sale as
fraudulent and void.
Buyer's Right to Goods on Seller's Insolvency: Section 2-502
There are two sections in the sales article which grant the buyer a
possessory remedy: section 2-502 and section 2-716. Section 2-502 is
designed to deal with the conflicting interest of buyers and the creditors
of an insolvent seller. It provides:
". .. a buyer who has paid a part or all of the price of goods
[identified to the contract] . . .may on making and keeping good
a tender of any unpaid portion of their price recover them from the
seller if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt df
the first instalment on their price."
An initial inquiry should be directed toward the fact that the provision
is phrased in terms of recovery from the seller, not the seller's creditors.
However, since the seller's insolvency would have given his creditors a
superior interest in his assets, the draftsmen may have contemplated that
the buyer's right to the goods on compliance with the requirements of the
section would also prevail over the seller's creditors. Moreover, since
specific performance might have been granted under prior law in such a
case on grounds of insolvency in spite of attachment liens held by creditors
on the goods, it is doubtful that this provision would have been limited
to rights against the seller without comment.
5 6
55. Where buyer advanced money for the purpose of enabling the seller to
procure or produce goods, some courts have attempted to protect the buyer by de-
scribing the relationship as a trust, a pledge or a mortgage. Hurley v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry., 213 U.S. 126 (1909); Parker v. Garrison, 61 IIl. 250 (1871);
Livesley v. Heise, 45 Ore. 148, 76 Pac. 952 (1904) ; Livesley v. Johnston, 45 Ore.
30, 76 Pac. 13, 946 (1904). This may be rationalized on the ground that the buyer
intended to hold a position other than that of a general creditor. See Horack,
Insolvency and Specific Performance, 31 HARv. L. REV. 702, 717-18 (1918). But cf.
Quittner v. Los Angeles Steel Casting Co., 202 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1953).
56. Unless the attaching creditor is a bona fide purchaser under applicable state
law, Bridgham v. Hinds, 120 Me. 444, 115 Atl. 197 (1921); Note, 31 ORE. L. REv.
162 (1952), his rights to the goods stand no higher than the seller's. North Chicago
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Even if a buyer meets all the conditions of section 2-502, the seller's
creditors may attempt to thwart buyer's taking possession of the goods by
showing the retention did not meet the requirements of section 2-402; for
example, the buyer may not have purchased the goods from a "merchant-
seller." Thus a buyer may qualify under section 2-502 but not under the
exception to section 2-402 which carves out the area in which retention
is not deemed fraudulent. If section 2-502 is interpreted to be unrestricted
by the requirements of section 2-402, the Code presents the anomalous
possibility that a buyer may recover goods under section 2-502, although
the retention was "fraudulent" under section 2-402. Yet, neither the com-
ments nor the cross-references in the Code recognize the possibility of
interrelationship between the two sections.57 There is no indication in
either section which should control in the event of conflict. However, the
buyer's right could easily have been subjected expressly to the requirements
of section 2-402 if such had been intended.
Some indication of the proper interplay of these sections might be
gleaned from the principle underlying the remedy of section 2-502. It is
possible that the provision is based upon the belief that funds given to the
seller within ten days of insolvency may still be in his possession. Since
creditors will be dividing the seller's assets, which presumably include these
funds, it would be equitable to allow the buyer to take the goods for which
he paid. If that be the rationale, then it seems logical to conclude that
the draftsmen intended to have section 2-502 apply without regard to
section 2-402 inasmuch as there is a special principle of the respective
interests of buyers and creditors that is fully vindicated in section 2-502.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the basic factual premise that a seller,
having received cash near the point of insolvency, will still have that cash
some days later is at least dubious.
A different rationale to section 2-502 is found in the obvious parallel
of that section with section 2-702, which authorizes a seller to reclaim
goods he delivered to a buyer on credit if the buyer becomes insolvent
within ten days after receipt. Both sections cross-refer to the other; there-
fore it is quite likely that the two sections are based on the same theory.
Section 2-702 is straightforward in adopting the idea of "implied fraud." 58
Briefly stated the doctrine is that a buyer who accepts goods shortly before
becoming insolvent will be conclusively presumed to have known of his
impending insolvency so that his acceptance of goods on credit, operating
as a tacit statement of financial ability to pay, is a misrepresentation of his
actual financial position. Carried over to section 2-502, this rationale
would be that a seller who accepts an advance payment shortly before
becoming insolvent will be conclusively presumed to have known of his
Rolling Mill Co. v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 152 U.S. 596 (1894); Ellery v.
Cumming, 40 Ariz. 512, 14 P.2d 709 (1932); Wilson v. Kruse, 270 Ill. 298, 110
N.E. 359 (1915) ; Day v. Traders' Nat'l Bank, 232 Ky. 662, 24 S.W.2d 576 (1930).
57. Some inference can be drawn, perhaps, from the failure of § 2-502 to refer
to creditors. See text at notes 55 and 56 supra.
58. See UCC § 2-702, comment 2.
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impending insolvency so that his acceptance of the money, operating as a
tacit statement of his financial ability to finish and deliver the goods, is a
misrepresentation of his actual financial position.
If the "implied fraud" rationale is the one accepted, it is inconclusive
as to whether or not section 2-502 is operative independently of section
2-402. The reasoning used before on the premise of the cash still being
in the seller's hands emphasized the consideration of the creditors' interests
in creating the remedy. The same is not true of "implied fraud." That
considers only the rights of buyer vis-A-vis the seller; it is premised on
the seller's defrauding the buyer. In fact, the language of the section refers
to recovery "from the seller." If the draftsmen were not advertent to
reconciling the interests of buyers and creditors, it cannot be said that
they intended section 2-502 to operate without regard to some provision
which does deal with buyers versus creditors. If any conclusion is to be
drawn, therefore, it would be that there is little in the present Code that
aids in deciding whether a buyer is not entitled to the remedy of section
2-502 if his rights can be set aside by creditors under section 2-402.
The foregoing discussion indicates the problems that may arise in
fraud-in-law jurisdictions on attempting to reconcile sections 2-402 and
2-502, but even in a presumption jurisdiction, where the exception in
section 2-402 is inapplicable,5 9 the operation of section 2-502 is not per-
fectly clear. Section 2-502 has no requirement of good faith while the
presumption doctrine turns principally on that issue.60 Thus the same
anomalous possibility arises, even in a presumption jurisdiction, that the
buyer could recover under the Code even though the seller's retention is
deemed fraudulent under existing law. The stringent requirements of
section 2-502 that the buyer must have prepaid the first installment within
ten days before the seller's insolvency would limit the number of situations
in which this conflict arises, but the problem merits clarification by drafts-
men and revisers.
Bankruptcy Act Restrictions.-The scope of applicability of section
2-502 may be considerably smaller than would appear from its language.
Since the buyer's right under section 2-502 is predicated on the seller's
insolvency, it might be held that the buyer's recovery constitutes a voidable
preference under the Bankruptcy Act.8 ' The federal statute specifies that
for purposes of the provision defining preferences,
". .. a transfer of property other than real property shall be deemed
to have been made or suffered at the time when it became so far
perfected that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by
legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become supe-
rior to the rights of the transferee." 62
59. See text at note 36 supra.
60. See text at notes 21 and 22 sura.
61. 52 STAT. 840 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§1-1103 (1952).
62. 64 STAT. 25 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §96a(2) (1952).
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If the buyer's interest in the goods under section 2-502 is not transferred
to him until the seller's insolvency, then granting buyer possession will
be a voidable preference.63 However, if section 2-502 is interpreted as
transferring some right to the buyer when he prepays, a right which is later
matured if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days, then the transfer
may be deemed effected before the seller was insolvent and not rendered
voidable by the Bankruptcy Act.
The subcommittee report on section 2-502 '4 meets the contention that
the provision creates a voidable preference by referring to authority that
delivery of goods pursuant to a pre-existing contract of sale is not a prefer-
ence.65 However, it does recognize that such questions are outside the
realm of state law. Therefore, if there is a conflict with provisions of fed-
eral law, the buyer's remedy under section 2-502 will be ineffectual.
Under prior law, the buyer was in a similar position. When the goods
attached were in various stages of completion, the buyer was allowed to
recover only those goods which had been appropriated to the contract,"6
and in the fraud-in-law jurisdiction, might lose his rights to even these
goods. Unless the buyer's title to the goods was perfected prior to the
seller's insolvency, delivery of the goods to the buyer constituted a voidable
preference in bankruptcy.
67
The effect of the interposition of the Bankruptcy Act will be significant
only to the extent that the seller's insolvency is defined in the Code as in-
solvency "within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law." 6 8 Since
the Code also defines an insolvent person as one "who either has ceased to
pay his debts in the ordinary course of business or cannot pay his debts
as they become due," 69 in these latter cases the Bankruptcy Act will be
inapplicable and the buyer may avail himself of his remedy under section
2-502.
63. The Bankruptcy Act defines a preference as "... a transfer, as defined in
this Act, of any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or
on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent
and within four months before the filing by or against him of the petition initiating
a proceeding under this Act, the effect of which transfer will be to enable such credi-
tor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same
class." Id. at 25, 11 U.S.C. § 96a(1) (1952). Section 96b provides for voiding such
preferences under certain circumstances. 52 STAT. 870 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96b
(1952).
64. UCC, Supplement No. 1, at 103 (Sub-Committee Report 1955).
65. In re Shipley Stave & Lumber Co., 29 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Ky. 1939). But
cf. Quittner v. Los Angeles Steel Casting Co., 202 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1953).
66. Ely & Walker Dry Goods Co. v. Adams Mfg. Co., 105 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.
1939) ; cf. Huseby v. Kilgore, 32 Wash. 2d 179, 201 P.2d 148 (1948).
67. Compare Quittner v. Los Angeles Steel Casting Co., 202 F.2d 814 (9th
Cir. 1953), with Grief Bros. Cooperage Co. v. Mullinix, 264 Fed. 391 (8th Cir.
1920).
68. This is one of the three definitions of "insolvent" UCC § 1-201(23). Under
the Bankruptcy Act, "a person shall be deemed insolvent within the provisions of
this title whenever the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property which
he may have conveyed, transferred, concealed, removed, or permitted to be concealed
or removed, with intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors, shall not at a fair
valuation be sufficient in amount to pay his debts;" 52 Stat. 841 (1946), 11 USC
§ 1(19) (1952).
69. UCC § 1-201(23).
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Buyer's Right to Specific Performance or Replevin: Section 2-716
The second possessory remedy which the Code gives to the buyer is
found in section 2-716 which provides:
"(3) The buyer has a right of replevin for goods identified to the
contract if after reasonable effort he is unable to effect cover ... "
This provision gives the remedy of replevin only to the buyer who cannot
cover, i.e., make a reasonable purchase of goods in substitution for those
due from the seller.70 In its application to the type of problem considered
by this Note, it appears that where a buyer cannot cover, and thus has a
right to possession, he may nonetheless fail to obtain the goods if a creditor
can treat the sale as fraudulent under section 2-402. If the buyer can
cover, he cannot assert a right to replevin, and there would be no need
to apply the theory of fraudulent retention to prevent his recovery of the
goods.
It is questionable, however, whether the requirement that buyer be
unable to cover in order to be entitled to the specific remedy of section
2-716 was meant to apply in the event of the seller's insolvency. To be
sure, the language of the section does not restrict its operation to cases of
solvent sellers. Yet its refusal of a remedy to the buyer who can cover is
inequitable when seller is insolvent. The distinction places some buyers
in the role of general creditors of an insolvent debtor with little chance of
full recovery while others get the goods they want from the seller without
loss. It appears, therefore, that cases will arise in which the application of
section 2-402 would determine that as against the creditor, the buyer
prevails because the retention by the seller was not fraudulent and yet the
buyer is unable to find a Code provision which gives him a right to posses-
sion. This buyer is one whose goods have been identified to the con-
tract,71 but who can cover. Of course, section 2-502 partially fills the need
of the buyer who can cover, but its scope is very narrow.
It is reasonable to suppose that the draftsmen did not intend thus to
cut off the rights of a group of buyers. If it is assumed that the failure to
provide a specific remedy for such a case was inadvertent, a court might
resort to section 1-106(2) which provides:
"Any right or obligation declared by this Act is enforceable by action
unless the provision declaring it specifies a different and limited
effect."
The comment clarifies that an action should be allowed when a right exists
"even though no remedy may be expressly provided." 2 To authorize a
70. UCC § 2-712(1).
71. The identification of the goods to the contract establishes the applicability
of § 2-402 and is a prerequisite to replevin under § 2-716.
72. UCC § 1-106(2), comment 2.
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buyer to recover under a remedy fashioned from this section, the court
must read section 2-402 as giving the buyer a right, and not merely creating
a power in the creditors to cut off certain rights of the buyers. Such an
interpretation avoids the inequities of the present statutory pattern, but it
is manifestly more desirable that amendments be made to provide the
buyer a broader remedy in the event of the seller's insolvency. It may be
possible to achieve this result by a liberal construction of the provision
which defines cover in terms of "reasonable purchase" elsewhere.78 If a
court were to assume that such purchase is reasonable only if the buyer
is able to recover adequate damages from the seller, the buyer may be en-
titled to replevin.
An alternate path to a broader remedy may be section 2-716(1)
which provides:
"Specific performance may be decreed when the goods are unique or
in other proper circumstances."
The comment to this section states it continues general prior policy as to
specific performance and seeks to further a more liberal attitude than some
courts have shown.74 Since under prior law, specific performance for the
buyer when the seller was insolvent was not generally available though
it was possible for the buyer to procure the goods under certain circum-
stances,7 5 it remains unclear whether the new liberal attitude referred
to in the comment was intended to permit specific performance in the in-
solvency situation. Even if the court were inclined to permit specific per-
formance under section 2-712(1) or to stretch the reasonable requirement
in section 2-716(1), both of these constructions are open to the objection
that they create voidable preferences under the federal bankruptcy act.76
Tim SEcuRED TRANSACTION ARTICLE
The Code's attempt to reconcile the competing claims of the buyer and
seller's creditors cannot be analyzed without considering the impact of
article 9 on secured transactions. It will be recalled that the primary
justification for allowing the buyer to recover goods that were in the
seller's possession at insolvency is to aid the buyer who has made an ad-
vance payment. If article 9 were applicable, it would afford the prepay-
ing buyer an opportunity to protect his claim to the goods by filing a financ-
ing statement which would perfect the interest 7 7 and give notice to the
creditors.
The utility of the solution offered by article 9 will depend on whether
or not a buyer is entitled to a security interest, but this determination proves
73. UCC § 2-712(1).
74. UCC §2-716(1), comment 1.
75. See note 54 supra.
76. See discussion in text at notes 63-69 smtpra.
77. UCC § 9-302.
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difficult. The strongest evidence that a buyer may have such a security
interest is found in the language of section 9-204(6) that:
"When a buyer makes an advance or otherwise gives new value for
the purpose of enabling his seller to obtain or manufacture goods, a
security interest in favor of the buyer attaches to the goods by virtue
of the contract for sale as soon as they have become identified to the
contract."
The purpose of this section is to provide when a security interest attaches,
not to define what is a security interest. However, the unmistakably dear
reference to a security interest in certain buyers who make advance pay-
ments is a strong indication that such an interest does exist.78
A countervailing implication can be drawn from the Code's definition
of security interest in section 1-201(37) which states:
"'Security interest' means an interest in property which secures pay-
ment or performance of an obligation . . . . The term also includes
the interest of a financing buyer of accounts, chattel paper, or contract
rights."
Since the specific reference to a financing buyer does not mention a buyer
of goods, his security interest must fall within the general definition of the
first sentence, if it is to fit under section 1-201(37) at all. That general
definition seems to contemplate the typical case of a chattel security arrange-
ment in which the creditor's right to receive money due on a debt is se-
cured by the additional right to take possession of the goods in case of the
debtor's default. In the case of a financing buyer, however, there is only
one right, namely the right to receive the goods. That is not contingent
upon default in the payment or performance of an obligation.
The conflict in the provisions of these two sections may be resolved
by resort to the comments to section 9-204 which provide: "[T]his sub-
section provides . . . that the security interest attaches: for the security
interest to prevail over creditors in cases of the seller's insolvency the buyer
will have to perfect his interest by filing." 79
The apparent conclusion that the financing buyer has a security interest
despite the incompatibility of section 1-201(37) gives rise to a further
problem of the scope of transactions where the buyer can obtain this security
interest. If the language of section 9-204(6) is accepted as the definition
of the security interest, the financing buyer is included only where there
are prepayments made for the purpose of enabling the seller to obtain or
manufacture the goods. It is not clear whether it is the intent of the buyer
alone or the intent of both parties that determines that the advance was
for the requisite purpose. It is obvious, however, that a prepayment can
78. Further support for this proposition is found in comment 9 to §9-204.
See discussion at pp. 109-10 infra.
79. UCC § 9-204(6), comment 9.
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be made for other purposes. For example, the purpose of the prepayment
might be to assure the seller that the buyer will perform when the goods
are completed. Such a payment, indicative only of the relative bargaining
positions of the parties, is outside the transaction described in the statute.
Other economic or commercial reasons that may underlie a prepayment
would not entitle the buyer to a security interest in this narrow sense. 0
Considered in terms of the overall problem of the conflict of interests be-
tween the buyer and the seller's creditors, the solution offered by article 9,
if given the construction indicated by the language of section 9-204(6),
protects but a fraction of the buyers who may become involved in this
situation.
An alternate decision as to the scope of buyer's security interest
would be to construe the general section, 1-201(37), to be broad enough
to include all prepaying buyers. This can be done by ignoring the dual
rights to which section 1-201(37) seems to refer in its first sentences'
so that any prepayment transaction is encompassed. If that is done, it
is possible that all prepayment arrangements between the buyer and the
seller may be deemed security interests, not only those in which the advance
is made for the purpose of enabling the seller to obtain or manufacture the
goods. Such an expansion of the scope of article 9 was probably unintended
by the draftsmen of the Code, but none of the provisions of article 9 require
a contrary result. Indeed, the draftsmen stated in the comments to the first
section of the article that they intended to simplify the law and present an
opportunity for the development of new forms of security arrangements
without the need for new legislation.sla If the provisions of article 9 were
intended to apply to the prepaying buyer, this should be clarified and the
scope of the transaction covered should be explicitly delineated so that in-
ferences arising from inconsistent interpretations of sections 9-204(6) and
1-201(37) are unnecessary.
THE INTERPLAY oF ARTICLE 2 AND ARTICLE 9
The preceding sections indicate that both article 2 and article 9 have
attempted to resolve in some way the conflicting interests of the buyer
and the seller's creditors when the seller becomes insolvent while still in
possession of the goods. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear what the
effect will be where the various provisions call for different results. Even
if the inconsistencies within each article are settled, there is a further pos-
sibility that the decisions based on each article will conflict.
80. See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). The Korean
war's demands on the steel industry caused a period of short supply which would
ordinarily have operated to force steel prices up. Instead the industry maintained
its old prices while taking advantage of the favorable marketing situation to raise
prices indirectly by requiring purchasers to make interest-free advances of the
purchase price long before delivery. Such a prepayment is clearly not an enabling
advance, nor is it security guaranteeing performance by the buyer.
81. See discussion following note 72 supra.
81a. UCC §9-101, comment.
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The first problem is to reconcile the security interest under article
9 with the remedy of section 2-502. Both apply only in the event that
there has been some prepayment by the buyer and both take effect at the
time the goods are identified to the contract. The narrow security interest
defined from the wording of section 9-204(6) restricts the article 9 cover-
age to the buyer who pays in advance for the purpose of enabling the seller
to obtain or manufacture the goods in question. Section 2-502 applies to
any prepayment without regard to its purpose. The ten day restriction
found in section 2-502, on the other hand, is inapplicable in considering the
security interest of the buyer. Therefore, it is possible that cases can arise
in which the buyer would prevail under both article 9 and section 2-502,
or neither, but the real trouble stems from the cases in which the buyer
succeeds under one but not the other of these protections. The comment
to section 2-502 hints that if that section is applicable, there is no need
to look further. It states:
"The question of whether the buyer also acquires a security interest
in identified goods and has rights to the goods when insolvency takes
place after the ten-day period provided in this section is governed by
the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions." 82
If that be the accepted interpretation, it means that any buyer who makes
a prepayment, whether it be an enabling advance or a deposit to guarantee
performance, is protected by section 2-502 for ten days. Even if such a
buyer is eligible to have an article 9 security interest and has failed to
comply with the filing requirements necessary to perfect his interest,83
he is nevertheless protected for ten days. After that period, only those
buyers who have made enabling advances can obtain the security interest.
Under the above analysis of the interplay of section 2-502 and article
9, serious difficulties are discovered in an attempt to find the place of sec-
tion 2-402 in the pattern. It is not unreasonable to assume that section
2-402 should be the keystone in the Code's handling of this problem since
it is the only section which purports to deal with the conflict of the buyer
and the seller's creditors.
In an earlier section, the interaction of sections 2-402 and 2-502 was
considered.84 It is also necessary to determine whether or not a buyer who
may be entitled to the security interest mentioned in section 9-204(6) must
also qualify within the merchant-seller exception of section 2-402.
There is some evidence in the Code itself that the two provisions are
not interdependent. Comment 9 to section 9-204(6) states that under the
common-law rule a seller's retention of the goods sold might be held fraud-
82. UCC § 2-502, comment 2. (Emphasis added.) The italicized portions of
the quotation indicate that the right to get a security interest or the right to the
goods after ten days are additional rights which are separate and distinct from
the right granted by § 2-502.
83. See UCC § 9-302.
84. See discussion at text following notes 57 and 58 supra.
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ulent. The comment continues that this section is designed to reverse
that common-law rule:
"This subsection gives such a buyer the wherewithal to subject the
goods, which are being manufactured for him and for which he has
made advances, to a security interest in his favor."
No mention is made of section 2-402, and no cross-reference to article 2
is indicated. If the security interest is sufficient to overrule the common
law, there is no reason for looking to article 2 to decide the proper ap-
plication of the security interest provision.
In their comments to section 2-402, on the other hand, the draftsmen
of the Code do refer to article 9 saying:
. .. an enabling advance . . . is recognized as in current course
of trade and is specifically protected in this Act (Article 9)." s5
It seems probable that the "enabling advance" referred to is the same pre-
payment treated in section 9-204(6). However, the sentence appears in a
comment which apparently aims to clarify "current course of trade" and
"commercially reasonable time." These are tests for the application of
section 2-402.
It may be argued that this comment is evidence of an-intent to apply
both the tests of section 2-402 and those connected with a security interest
to a transaction which begins with an enabling advance. The analysis
would be as follows: the buyer who makes an enabling advance is entitled
to obtain a security interest to protect his investment under article 9;
nevertheless, the draftsmen have stated that such an 'enabling advance
qualifies under one of the tests of section 2-402; presumably, therefore, all
the standards of section 2-402 are applicable to the enabling transaction
and the buyer can lose his rights to the specific goods in which he has a
perfected security interest when the creditors can void the sale as fraud-
ulent under section 2-402, e.g., the buyer is not dealing with a merchant-
seller. Such a conclusion is not prohibited by the language of the Code,
but it sets a trap for the unwary buyer who relies solely on the protection
of the security interest.
However, the conclusion rests on a basic premise which may not be
valid, namely, that the security interest provision and the standards of sec-
tion 2-402 are both applicable to a single transaction. An equally tenable
inference, perhaps, is that the purpose of the comment was to cover cases
in which the buyer, although entitled to a security interest for his enabling
advance, did not perfect it. In such an event, he may still prevail unless
the creditors can upset the sale as fraudulent. Thus the comment is saying
that if article 9 is not conclusive, then section 2-402 applies.
85. UCC § 2-402, comment 2.
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Any theory of the respective roles of article 2 and article 9 which rests
on nothing more than the inference to be drawn from possible accidental
language in an explanatory comment is manifestly not compelling. It is
entirely possible, for example, that section 2-402 is meant to apply only
to those cases in which there has been no advance payment, or to those
cases in which the buyer is not entitled to a security interest under article
9. Whatever be the conclusion that is worked out by the courts that must
construe the Code, it is clear that the answer is not demanded by any
clause presently found in the Act.
